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Introduction
The study of the characteristics of shareholders 
and managers and their effect on various 
variables related to the company, mainly its 
value, is extensive. Among the most analyzed 
characteristics are the shareholder structure 
[84], the composition of the board of directors 
[1], and the combining of the positions of CEO 
and chairman of the board of directors in the 
same person [10].
One of the characteristics that has been the 
focus of increasing interest for researchers is 
the presence of women on corporate boards 
of directors (for a comprehensive survey on 
the presence of women on corporate boards of 
directors, see [79]). However, the presence of 
women on the board has become an important 
topic, not only for academic reasons but also for 
social reasons. In recent years there has been 
pressure from society to include women on the 
boards of directors. As a consequence, the 
average number of women in boardrooms has 
increased in the European Union from 5% in 
2001 to 8.1% in 2007, but it is still a small fi gure.
Focusing on 2007 data, even if the gap 
has been reduced in recent years [36], fi gures 
are larger for the Unites States (13.6%) and 
Canada (11.2%) than for Europe. Inside the 
European Union there are also important 
differences by country. For example, Portugal 
is the country that has fewest women on 
boards with only 0.7%. In contrast, Norway and 
Sweden have a higher proportion, with 37% 
and 21.3% of female directors, respectively. In 
Spain the presence of women in boardrooms 
(of IBEX-35 index fi rms – 35 top companies 
in capitalization) is about 3.1% of all directors, 
a fi gure that is similar to Italy (2.3%) and Japan 
(2%) [24].
To correct this situation several steps have 
been taken in Spain. In May 2006 the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CNMV, 
(Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission) 
passed the Código Unifi cado de Buen Gobierno 
(Unifi ed Code of Good Governance). In Article 
15, this Code recommends that the board of 
directors refl ect the diversity of knowledge, 
gender and experience required to perform its 
functions with effectiveness, objectivity and 
independence. To achieve this objective, the 
Code suggests positive discrimination in order 
to balance fi gures for men and women on 
boards.
In March 2007 the Spanish parliament 
approved the Ley de Igualdad (Gender Equality 
Act). On the topic of the board of directors, 
this law suggests at least 40% of directors be 
women by 2015, but this quota is not mandatory 
and merely a recommendation. However, 
companies that do not comply with this quota 
will be unable to bid for public contracts. This 
law came into effect the 24th of March, 2007 and 
it applies to public and private fi rms with more 
than 250 employees.
The requirement that 40% of board 
members should be women is an imitation of 
a Norwegian law approved in January 2003. 
That law required the achievement of the quota 
of 40% female representation on boards in fi ve 
years. Between 2003 and 2008 the percentage 
quadrupled to a value of 38% [37], and Norway 
is at the head of European countries for female 
representation on boards of directors.
All these rules made in Spain in the 
business fi eld have focused on large 
companies. However, micro-enterprises and 
small enterprises are not only more numerous, 
but they are also the main engines of economic 
growth and employment. In Spain, on 1st 
January 2009, 99.88% of fi rms were SMEs 
(Central Companies Directory).
Another aspect that has attracted the 
interest of researchers in recent times is the 
presence of women as CEO [14]. Traditionally, 
this position has been fi lled predominantly by 
men. However, evidence has shown that fi rms 
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whose CEO is a woman have higher levels of 
returns on average [82].
More participatory management styles 
may lead to higher returns [5], as women are 
more prone to cooperate with other managers 
[38]. Another explanation of higher returns of 
companies whose CEOs are women is provided 
by Mohr and Wolfram [56]. According to these 
authors, commitment to the fi rm and employee 
satisfaction in the workplace strongly infl uences 
the performance of a fi rm. Communication with 
the employees is essential to create a positive 
climate of trust. According to Mohr and Wolfram 
[56], women are more effective communicators.
Based on previous arguments, it would 
seem that there should be larger number of 
women as CEOs. However, research shows 
that even if the numbers of men and women 
in management jobs in general are relatively 
close, this is not the case for CEOs ([15] and 
[18]).
Until now, most studies on this fi eld 
have focused on analyzing the effect of 
gender diversity on the performance of large 
companies [25], [32]. According to Soltane 
[77], the more women are on the board, the 
better is the performance in the company. 
Other studies examined legal environments, 
environmental factors and processes that 
infl uence entrepreneurship among women [12], 
[13], [49].
Research on fi nancial decisions and their 
relationship with the gender of managers is 
very limited, especially in the fi eld of small 
enterprises. These companies are especially 
interesting for the study of the contribution of 
women as directors, given that their governing 
bodies tend to be smaller, less structured 
and less complex, so that each member has 
a greater capacity to infl uence decision-making 
[42].
Gender may infl uence the level of corporate 
debt, as well as its cost and maturity. There are 
two main arguments why this should be the 
case. On the one hand, women often prefer 
to accept lower levels of risk [23], [76]. On 
the other hand, there may be discrimination 
for reasons of gender on the part of the credit 
supply [12], [17].
This study has several novel features. First, 
the fi rms analyzed are small, unlike the fi rms 
that provide most of the previous empirical 
evidence. Second, we examine companies 
in their fi rst year of life (star-up fi rms) where 
the differences in preference for fi nancing, 
discrimination on the part of the suppliers of 
funds and diffi culty in accessing fi nance may be 
more evident. Finally, unlike previous papers, 
we discuss three variables relating to the 
fi nancial structure: level of debt, debt maturity 
and debt cost. In addition, the Spanish market 
is generally thought to be part of the continental 
system or civil law system, in contrast with the 
American market, which provides most of the 
available evidence, and belongs to the common 
law or Anglo-Saxon system. The differences 
between the two systems are large, but can be 
summarised in three points: companies in the 
Anglo-Saxon system tend to have much more 
dispersed shareholder structures, there is more 
investor protection and the external control 
mechanisms are relatively strong [46], [47]. 
Because of these characteristics, the study of 
the composition of boards of directors may be 
more relevant in markets like Spain.
The results reveal a negative infl uence on 
fi rms’ debt levels of the presence of women on 
the boards or as CEO. This negative effect can 
also be seen when boards are more gender-
diverse. In addition, gender diversity drives 
toward lower costs and higher debt maturity. 
Therefore, it seems that risk aversion on the 
part of women is a better explanation for the 
results than discrimination on the supply side.
The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. The Section One presents the theory 
and hypotheses. Section Two describes the 
sample, the data and the methodology. The 
results are presented in Section Three. Finally, 
we present the main conclusions.
1. Theory and Hypotheses
Financing and capital structure are one of the 
most examined topics in the fi nancial literature. 
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller [54] published 
one of the most infl uential papers in the 
fi nancial literature where they demonstrated 
that the leverage adopted by a fi rm is 
irrelevant in perfect capital markets [56]. After 
this paper, many others have examined the 
infl uence of tax considerations [26], [53], [55], 
fi nancial distress [3], [6], [83], and information 
asymmetry and agency costs [30], [40], [59], 
[60]. As a consequence of these and many other 
papers, there exist two main non-excluding 
theories that attempt to explain existing fi rms’ 
capital structures: trade-off theory and pecking 
order theory.
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The trade-off theory considers that each fi rm 
has an optimal debt level that may be reached 
balancing the advantages and disadvantages 
of market imperfections (mainly taxes, costs 
of fi nancial distress, and agency costs and 
information asymmetry).
Pecking order theory was fi rst modelled 
by Myers and Majluf [60]. Myers and Majluf 
consider that the empirical evidence is not 
consistent with a fi nancial policy that is 
determined by a trade-off of the advantages 
and disadvantages of market imperfections 
[60]. Rather, companies’ fi nancial policies 
seem to be better explained by the behaviour 
described by Donaldson [29]. He establishes 
a hierarchy describing company preferences 
for internal fi nancial sources over external 
fi nancial sources; in the case of external 
fi nancial sources, a company prefers debt fi rst, 
then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, 
and fi nally equity issues.
However, trade-off and pecking-order 
are not the only relevant theories related to 
capital structure. Another infl uential theory is 
the fi nancial growth cycle theory [7]. According 
to this theory, there are several variables that 
infl uence the level of information asymmetry 
in companies, and the age and the size are 
amongst the most important ones.
Normally, older companies are considered 
to have lower levels of information asymmetry. 
This is due to the fact that older companies 
are considered to be more consolidated and 
external investors know about the company’s 
situation [27], [85]. On the other hand, young 
companies, and especially start-ups, present 
higher economic growth and opportunities. This 
could imply new investment projects and thus 
larger information asymmetry.
Size may also reduce the information 
asymmetry. This is because large companies are 
less risky, as they are usually more diversifi ed 
[67], [69], [83]. Larger companies also produce 
more accounting and fi nancial information for 
creditors and investors in general [31], so that it 
is less costly to control them.
Several papers, among which is the one by 
Berger and Udell [7], establish the explanation 
that companies fi nance themselves in different 
ways depending on the phase they occupy in 
their fi nancial growth cycle. The main sources 
of external fi nancing for small start-up fi rms 
are commercial credits and (short-term) bank 
loans. Some of the empirical implications of the 
fi nancial growth cycle have already been tested 
in the Spanish market [73].
Several papers that follow this line of study 
conclude that the size of a company is a factor 
that infl uences not only on the availability, but 
also the maturity and the cost, of credit for 
companies [65], [66], [74]. Small enterprises 
have more problems securing long-term and 
low-cost funds [80]. The problems arising from 
the existence of asymmetry of information mean 
that fi nancial institutions cannot properly assess 
their borrowers’ investment projects (adverse 
selection problem), or control their opportunistic 
behaviours (moral hazard problem).
In addition, large companies may negotiate 
favorable access to various types of fi nancial 
sources, since they have more tangible assets 
that can be used as collateral [33]. This implies 
that small enterprises have trouble accessing 
fi nance, and are consequently left with the 
limited choices of self-fi nancing [22], the 
investment of money of the owners (or family) 
[64], [72], [81] and (short term) borrowing.
Focusing on diversity, group diversity is 
defi ned as the variety of individual attributes 
within a group [8]. Most arguments related to 
information/decision-making theories predict 
a positive infl uence of diversity on group 
outcomes. Thus, Robinson and Dechant [70] 
argue that greater diversity in working groups 
implies a better knowledge of the market and 
a better identifi cation with customers and 
employees, thereby increasing the company’s 
ability to penetrate markets. Similarly, the more 
diverse a group is, the more different views and 
perspectives its members will have, as well as 
more alternative solutions to a problem, leading 
to more realistic decisions being taken [57].
However, there are also arguments 
that increased diversity may have negative 
effects on group outcomes. These arguments 
come from social identifi cation and social 
categorization theories. According to these 
theories, individuals divide the group members 
into in-groups (individuals similar to themselves) 
and out-groups (individuals dissimilar to 
themselves), having a tendency to perceive the 
former positively and the latter negatively [61].
Gender diversity is part of group diversity 
and it may also have an infl uence on fi rm 
behaviour. As an example, Loden [50] argues 
that women are qualitatively oriented while 
men are oriented quantitatively, an argument 
which could support the belief that women are 
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more successful in some specifi c tasks. Thus, 
women directors may exert a positive infl uence 
on the fi rm in tasks related to corporate social 
responsibility and strategic control. In contrast, 
the presence of women on the board may have 
a negative infl uence, as they may have fewer 
relationships with boards of other fi rms [86], and 
are less likely to have business occupations 
[45].
With regard to fi nancial decisions, the 
different level of risk aversion between men 
and women may be extremely important. Many 
papers provide arguments and evidence to 
show that women tend to prefer a lower level 
of risk [76], [41], [11], [23], [63], [20], [75]. As an 
example, it seems that women entrepreneurs 
tend to run smaller companies and their fi rms 
are more concentrated in the service sector 
[20], [44], [51]. They also tend to run fi rms that 
have lower debt levels, which may be because 
they try to reduce the costs of bankruptcy 
and are reluctant to provide the necessary 
guarantees to obtain a loan [19]. Romani et al. 
[71] also fi nd that women invest less money in 
their businesses and expect lower returns than 
men.
However, lower levels of debt in enterprises 
run by women may also be explained by other 
factors related to gender such as discrimination 
on the part of credit suppliers [58]. There is 
evidence that the decisions of the banks about 
loan requests are different for men and women, 
even when businesses are similar in terms of 
liquidity and solvency. Buttner and Rosen [16] 
found that banks perceive that men have more 
probability of business success than women. 
Other papers show that gender discrimination 
not only appears in the fi nal decision of granting 
of credit but also throughout the application 
and negotiation process, placing women at 
a disadvantage or discouraging them during 
that process [12], [75].
These arguments (greater risk aversion 
among women and discrimination on the part 
of the supplies of credit) may infl uence not 
only the level of debt of fi rms, but also the cost 
and maturity of debt. Thus, a higher cost of 
debt in companies where women participate 
in management would be a clear sign of 
discrimination, while a lower cost could be seen 
as evidence that the participation of women in 
management reduces the risk to the company 
and thus the cost of fi nancing. Similarly, 
a longer term of maturity of debt in companies 
managed by women would be a sign of their 
greater risk aversion [62].
Although there are confl icting arguments, 
based on the discussion in the literature we 
present three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Companies run by 
women and groups with gender diversity will 
have lower debt levels. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Companies run by 
women and groups with gender diversity will 
enjoy a lower cost of debt. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Companies run by 
women and groups with gender diversity will 
have debt that has longer terms to maturity. 
2. Sample, Data and Methodology
2.1 Sample
The empirical study is carried out by using the 
SABI database (The Iberian Balance Sheet 
Analysis System created by Bureau Van Dijk). 
This database provides accounting information 
for Spanish and Portuguese companies, 
obtained from the annual published accounts. 
Companies belonging to the fi nancial and 
insurance sectors are excluded.
The sample includes small fi rms, namely 
fi rms that have no more than 50 employees, 
an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million, 
and total assets not exceeding €43 million 
(recommendation 2003/361/CE of the European 
Commission, 6 May 2003). The initial database 
was fi ltered to eliminate companies that had 
negative equity and fi rms whose total assets 
or total liabilities were not equal to the sum of 
their components. In addition, given that our 
purpose is to analyze the infl uence of gender 
in fi nancing, we also removed fi rms controlled 
by other companies from our sample. The fi nal 
data base includes 12,376 start-up companies, 
founded in 2007, whose fi rst year of life is 2008.
2.2 Data
The dependent variables considered are debt 
(DEBT), the cost of the debt (COSTD) and the 
maturity of the debt (MATUR). For the model of 
debt level, the dependent variable is calculated 
as the ratio of debt to total assets [74]. The cost 
of debt is computed as the ratio of fi nancial 
expenses to total debt. The maturity of the debt 
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is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt [4].
To measure the presence of women and 
gender diversity we employ the following 
variables: A dummy variable, DWOMEN, which 
takes the value 1 when the CEO is a woman 
and 0 when it is a man; ADM, computed as the 
total number of women on the board divided by 
the total number of members of the board. Two 
indices are used to measure gender diversity. 
On the one hand, the BLAU index is defi ned 
as:  ni iP1 21 , where Pi refers to the ratio of 
women on the board. The values of this index 
range between 0 and a maximum of 0.5; the 
latter occurs when there is the same percentage 
of men and women on the board. On the other 
hand, the SHANNON index is defi ned as: 
Pni i1 1nPi , where Pi is estimated as in 
the BLAU index. The values of this index range 
between 0 and a maximum of 0.69; The latter 
corresponds to the greatest possible diversity 
[35], [78].
The control variables in relation to the 
debt model are the following: fi rms’ returns 
on assets (ROA), measured as the earnings 
before taxes and fi nancial expenses divided by 
total assets [39]; the fi rm size (SIZE), calculated 
as the natural logarithm of total assets [33]; the 
tangible assets ratio (FIXED), measured as net 
tangible assets divided by total assets [33], [68]; 
the economic risk (ECRISK), computed as the 
square of the difference of the annual returns 
of a company and the annual profi tability of 
all businesses, multiplied by the sign of such 
difference [34]; and the liquidity ratio (LIQ), 
measured as the working capital divided by 
total assets [2]. In addition, we consider debt 
maturity (MATUR) and debt cost (COSTD) 
which are defi ned above.
Thus, for the analysis of the debt level we 
defi ne the following model:
iii MATURGENDEBT  210 
iii FIXEDSIZEROA  543 
iECRISK  6 iii uCOSTDLIQ  87 
 (1)
where i = 1,..., n, denotes the company 
and GEN is one of the alternative measures of 
gender diversity defi ned above.
The second model examined focuses 
on the cost of debt (COSTD). It includes as 
control variables, the fi rms’ size (SIZE); the 
fi rms’ returns on assets (ROA); the growth 
opportunities (GROWP), computed as the 
depreciation of assets divided by total assets 
[74]; the debt level (DEBT); the debt maturity 
(MATUR); and the solvency ratio (SOLV), which 
determines the ability of the company to meet 
their commitments in the long term, measured 
as cash fl ow divided by total assets.
The cost of debt model is defi ned as follows:
iii SIZEGENCOSTD  210 
iii SOLVGROWPROA  543 
iDEBT  6 ii uMATUR 7
 
(2)
where i = 1,..., n, denotes the company 
and GEN is one of the alternative measures of 
gender diversity defi ned above.
The third model focuses on the debt 
maturity (MATUR). It includes, as control 
variables, the tangible assets ratio (FIXED); the 
sales rotation ratio (ROTAT), computed as total 
sales divided by total assets [2]; the debt level 
(DEBT); the fi rms’ returns on assets (ROA); the 
growth opportunities (GROWP); the fi rm size 
(SIZE); the liquidity ratio (LIQ); and the cost of 
debt (COSTD).
The maturity of debt model is defi ned as 
follows:
iii DEBTGENMATUR  210 
iii FIXEDGROWPROA  543 
ii LIQSIZE  76  iROTAT 8
ii uCOSTD  9  (3)
where i = 1,..., n, denotes the company 
and GEN is one of the alternative measures of 
gender diversity defi ned above.
Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1. The mean level of debt (DEBT) is 
74.8%, exceeding 60%, the average fi gure for 
Spanish companies. The mean of the cost of 
debt (COSTD) is 3.5%. It must be highlighted 
that the sample examined includes micro and 
small fi rms that usually get their funds from 
bank credit [7], their own fi nance or from family 
and friends and, especially, microcredits. The 
mean of the debt maturity (MATUR) is 21.3%, 
confi rming that these fi rms largely employ short 
term debt. This may be due to the optimism 
of the entrepreneur or the greatest risk that 
the banks run when lending money to such 
companies [48]. 
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Regarding the variables of gender, 21% of 
the fi rms have a woman as CEO. The proportion 
of women on the board is high, 19%, compared 
with large companies where the corresponding 
fi gure is only close to 5% [52]. These fi gures 
may be related to self-employment as well as to 
family businesses.
2.3 Methodology
The methodology employed is Three Stage 
Least Squares (3SLS). This methodology 
controls the endogeneity of the variables, 
using a system of simultaneous equations [21]. 
This methodology has been used because 
of the peculiar characteristics of the sample, 
composed, as it is, of start-up fi rms with only 
a year of life. This circumstance makes it 
impossible to use a more powerful methodology 
such as panel data.
3. Results
The results of the estimation of Models 1, 
2 and 3 are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively.
In Table 2 it can be seen that a woman as 
CEO or the presence of women on the board 
exerts a signifi cant negative infl uence on the 
level of a fi rm’s debt. The same infl uence is 
observed when employing diversity indexes 
(Blau and Shannon indexes). Therefore, the 
Hypothesis 1 is confi rmed: Companies run 
by women and groups with gender diversity 
will have lower levels of debt. These results 
are consistent with most previous research. It 
may well be that women have greater aversion 
to risk [64], [9], [75], [41] which infl uences the 
fi rm’s debt level. Following the same reasoning, 
it should be noted that there is a major diffi culty 
for heterogeneous groups to reach agreement. 
The need to seek consensus often leads to less 
risky strategies [41]. However, this result could 
also be explained by discrimination on the 
supply side, which might result in banks lending 
less money to companies run by women.
With regard to the control variables, all 
of them are signifi cant and have a negative 
relationship with the debt level, with the 
exception of the risk and the maturity of the debt, 
which have a signifi cant positive relationship 
with the debt level. Debt may be used in order 
to secure tax advantages [67], but there are 
other tax deductions such as depreciation of 
fi xed assets [26] which could lead to a negative 
relationship between tangible assets (FIXED) 
Variable Mean Median Standard D. Minimum Maximum
DEBT 0.748 0.837 0.246 0.000 1.000
COSTD 0.035 0.016 0.234 0.000 12.561
MATUR 0.213 0.053 0.283 0.000 1.000
DWOMEN 0.210 0.000 0.428 0.000 9.000
ADM 0.190 0.000 0.356 0.000 1.000
BLAU 0.060 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.500
SHANNON 0.079 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.693
ROA -0.144 0.028 1.797 -92.059 20.263
SIZE 5.149 5.108 1.397 0.065 10.610
FIXED 0.238 0.153 0.245 0.000 1.000
ECRISK -3.015 0.030 117.926 -8,448.367 416.438
LIQ -0.177 0.015 1.989 -106.740 1.000
SOLV 0.121 0.071 0.274 0.000 20.653
GROWP 0.038 0.020 0.266 0.000 1.112
ROTAT 2.897 1.823 20.441 0.000 2,149.829
Source: [2]
Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics
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and the debt level that we fi nd in Table 2. Firm 
size [80] and liquidity also leads to reduced 
levels of debt.
In Table 3 the results related to the cost of 
debt can be found. We fi nd a signifi cant negative 
infl uence of the different variables relating to the 
presence of women and gender diversity on the 
cost of debt. This result does not support the 
argument that there is possible discrimination 
on the part of those who offer funds to women. 
On the contrary, it would support the argument 
that the presence of women in decision making 
may reduce risk that the fi rm is exposed to, 
leading to a lower cost of debt [62]. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) is confi rmed: Companies run 
by women and groups with gender diversity will 
enjoy a lower cost of debt.
Regarding the control variables, we observe 
a negative infl uence of fi rms’ returns on assets 
and the maturity of debt on the cost of the debt. 
Normally, longer terms of debt maturity lead to 
lower interest rates [7] and larger returns. On the 
other hand, we observe a positive effect of debt 
level, fi rm size and solvency ratio on the cost of 
debt. This last result may be consequence of 
the fact that more solvent fi rms have increased 
access to debt [81] and, therefore, bear higher 
costs.
In Table 4 we observe that the presence of 
women on the board or as CEO leads to longer 
terms of debt maturity. We also observe that 
gender-diverse boards use longer term debt. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 (H3) is confi rmed: 
Companies run by women and groups with 
MODEL DEBT DWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON
Constant
0.195*** 0.935*** 0.926*** 0.926***
(16.78) (76.93) (74.62) (77.14)
GEN
 -0.030*** -0.040*** -0.108*** -0.078***
(-4.24) (-5.14) (-6.32) (-6.46)
MATUR
0.904*** 0.887*** 0.882*** 0.885***
(91.11) (93.98) (90.58) (93.85)
ROA
-0.043*** -0.024* -0.027* -0.026**
(-2.86) (-1.67) (-1.87) (-1.85)
SIZE
-0.006** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(-2.32) (-3.62) (-3.05) (-2.84)
FIXED
-0.719*** -0.750*** -0.742*** -0.748***
(-59.21) (-64.65) (-62.37) (-64.65)
ECRISK
0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(5.66) (4.26) (4.15) (4.44)
LIQ
-0675*** -0.704*** -0.696*** -0.701***
(-64.47) (-71.08) (-68.50) (-70.89)
COSTD
-2.163*** -1.924*** -1.862*** -1.929***
(-41.35) (-39.83) (-38.85) (-40.02)
R2 -2.278 -1.613 -1.583 -1.621
X2 11,306.62*** 12,295.33*** 11,518.00*** 12,299.31***
Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316
z-Statistic in parenthesis    
* Signifi cant at the 90% level, **Signifi cant at the 95% level and *** Signifi cant at the 99% level. 
X2-Test of explanatory variables
Source: [2]
Tab. 2: Estimation of model 1 – debt level
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gender diversity will have debt that has longer 
terms to maturity.
In terms of the control variables, the level 
of debt, the tangible assets, the size of the fi rm, 
liquidity and the cost of debt have signifi cant 
positive infl uence on the debt maturity [43], 
[28]. The infl uence of the growth opportunities 
[59] and sales rotation is negative.
Conclusions
Gender and its infl uence on different variables 
of the fi rm have been attracting the attention 
of researchers. Several papers have indicated 
differences in the way that men and women run 
businesses and the infl uence of gender diversity 
in working groups. Most of these studies have 
examined the infl uence of gender diversity 
on fi rm value or fi rm risk. However, there are 
not many studies examining the infl uence of 
women on the fi nancial decisions of the fi rm, 
especially for small companies. Small fi rms are 
characterized by having very limited access 
to funding sources, and depending heavily on 
bank fi nancing.
Research on gender diversity has been 
increasing in recent years. The emergence 
of gender equality laws in many countries, 
including Spain, has helped this phenomenon. 
Several laws have been adopted in Spain to 
provide equal opportunities to women. The 
Código Unifi cado de Buen Gobierno (Unifi ed 
Code of Good Governance) recommends 
positive discrimination for women in Article 
15, in order to balance the numbers of men 
and women on boards. The Ley de Igualdad 
(Gender Equality Act) requires a 40% female 
representation on boards of directors of 
companies with more than 250 employees, 
MODEL COSTD DEWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON
Constant
0.195*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.187***
(16.78) (17.08) (16.63) (166.99)
GEN
-0.016*** -0.021*** -0.108*** -0.043***
(-3.04) (-3.45) (-6.32) (-4.45)
SIZE
0.002 0.003* 0.003** 0.004**
(1.02) (1.67) (1.97) (2.18)
ROA
-0.377*** -0.289*** -0.279*** -0.292***
(-11.11) (-8.57) (-7.94) (-8.68)
GROWP
-0.062 0.056 0.071 0.051
(-1.31) (1.17) (1.41) (1.07)
SOLV
0.391*** 0.300*** 0.288*** 0.302***
(11.10) (8.56) (7.90) (8.65)
DEBT
1.803*** 1.617*** 1.660*** 1.614***
(29.20) (26.94) (26.19) (26.93)
MATUR
-2.219*** -2.212*** -2.296*** -2.217***
(-36.82) (-37.35) (-36.86) (-37.47)
R2 -0.203 -0.178 -0.176 -0.178
X2 2,607.64*** 2,466.64*** 2,341.10*** 2,475.17***
Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316
z-Statistic in parenthesis
* Signifi cant at the 90% level, **Signifi cant at the 95% level and *** Signifi cant at the 99% level.
X2-Test of explanatory variables.
Source: [2]
Tab. 3: Estimation of model 2 – cost of the debt
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if they are to bid for public sector contracts. 
However, these and other rules have focused 
on large companies and not on small fi rms, 
which are more numerous and generate most 
of the employment in Spain.
This article examines the infl uence of 
gender on some fi nancial decisions of Spanish 
micro and small start-up enterprises. These 
fi rms have larger problems securing funding 
and the characteristics of the owners and 
managers are crucial to obtaining fi nancing, as 
well as the characteristics of specifi c projects. 
In contrast with previous papers, the present 
study examines not only the level of debt but 
also two other relevant fi nance variables: 
the cost of the debt and the maturity of debt. 
All this is examined in the Spanish context, 
characterized by a dominant presence of bank 
fi nancing.
For the sample examined, only 21% of 
CEOs are women and the percentage of female 
directors is 19%. These values are far to the 
objective of gender equality on top management 
positions of small start-up enterprises but are 
much larger than the fi gures for Spanish listed 
fi rms. The family ties and the greater possibility 
of create micro fi rms by women may explain 
these values.
MODEL MATUR DWOMEN ADM BLAU SHANNON
 Constant
-0.943*** -0.965*** -0.959*** -0.957***
(-70.10) (-77.63) (-75.37) (-77.81)
GEN
0.025*** 0.034*** 0.081*** 0.059***
(4.49) (5.48) (5.94) (6.10)
DEBT
0.957*** 0.953*** 0.955*** 0.954***
(106.18) (111.55) (107.35) (111.41)
ROA
-0.007 -0.019* -0.014 -0.018*
(-0.61) (-1.86) (-1.28) (-1.69)
GROWP
-0.430*** -0.419*** -0.418*** -0.423***
(-11.76) (-11.74) (-11.30) (-11.86)
FIXED
0.871*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.905***
(81.84) (90.71) (87.92) (90.93)
SIZE
0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(6.47) (9.24) (8.49) (8.44)
LIQ
0.808*** 0.837*** 0.835*** 0.837***
(81.94) (90.56) (87.53) (90.48)
ROTAT
-0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(-3.08) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.36)
COSTD
1.737*** 1.504*** 1.454*** 1.508***
(36.04) (34.32) (33.13) (34.40)
R2 -0.686 -0.309 -0.298 -0.313
F 15,337.66*** 17,765.38*** 16,556.80*** 17,717.96***
Obs. 6,782 7,316 6,906 7,316
z-Statistic in parenthesis
* Signifi cant at the 90% level, **Signifi cant at the 95% level and *** Signifi cant at the 99% level.
X2-Test of explanatory variables
Source: [2]
Tab. 4: Estimation of model 3 – maturity of the debt
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The results show that the presence of 
women, as CEOs or as members of boards of 
directors, leads to lower debt fi nancing. The 
results also show that the presence of women 
infl uences the companies in such a way that 
they have lower debt cost and higher debt 
maturity. These results are also seen where 
the boards are more gender-diverse. All this 
evidence supports the hypothesis that women 
are more averse to risk, while suggesting 
that there is little discrimination on the part of 
suppliers of credit.
This study can present both theoretical and 
empirical implications. We provide arguments 
relative to the effects of gender diversity not 
only on debt behavior but also on other fi nancial 
decision as debt cost and maturity. Therefore, 
we show that gender diversity can affect to the 
management of small fi rms. In this way, it can 
be interesting to extend the recommendations 
about equality to this type of fi rms. We fi nd that 
gender diversity reduces the debt ratio and the 
cost of the debt and increases the debt maturity. 
So, women can improve the fi nancial situation 
and the fi rm stability in a crisis context. In this 
way, to promote women to top management 
positions of fi rm is not only adequate for ethical 
reasons but also for effectiveness.
This research is part of the project 
FEM2013-40578-P fi nanced by the Ministerio 
de Economía y Competitividad (Government 
of Spain). We also acknowledge support from 
Fundación CajaMurcia.
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Abstract
THE INFLUENCE OF GENDER ON FINANCIAL DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM 
SMALL START-UP FIRMS IN SPAIN
Carmen Maria Hernandez-Nicolas, Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo, 
Antonio Mínguez-Vera
The presence of women in management positions in companies is one of the topics that have 
generated the most interest and controversy over recent years. This has also been the case in Spain, 
where several legal initiatives have promoted the presence of women on decision-making bodies 
of companies. These important and pioneering legislative initiatives focus on the recommendation 
of positive discrimination in favour of women in large fi rms. This measure is justifi ed not only for 
reasons of ethics or social justice, but also for the purposes of effi ciency and rational economic 
behaviour. These laws have created an open debate in Spain and in other countries where they 
have been enacted and they have attracted the attention of researchers. In this context, the majority 
of the studies have attempted to analyse the effect of gender diversity among top managers on 
corporate performance of listed fi rms. On the contrary, this paper analyses the infl uence of gender 
on some fi nancial decisions, using a sample of 12,376 Spanish small and micro start-up fi rms. 
Unlike previous papers, this manuscript examines not only the level of debt but also the cost and 
maturity of the debt. To control the endogeneity of the variables, a system of simultaneous equation 
with Three Stage Least Squares methodology is employed. The results show that companies run 
by women and boards with gender diversity tend to borrow less, have lower costs for debt and 
longer term debt, reinforcing the hypothesis that females are more risk averse. These results are 
robust for diverse measures of gender diversity (the presence of a woman as CEO, the percentage 
of female directors and Blau and Shannon diversity indexes).
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